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Different studies have shown that when a subject is asked 
to recall autobiographical memories, the affective valence of 
the recalled memories is congruent with the subject’s mood 
(for a review, see Blaney, 1986). For instance, Snyder and 
White (1982) observed that participants who were exposed 
to a positive mood induction tended to recall happy personal 
experiences (e.g., getting a good grade), whereas those ex-
posed to a negative mood induction recalled fewer happy 
and more unpleasant personal experiences (e.g., break up of 
a romantic relationship). 
Usually, three main explanations have been offered to 
account for mood congruent recall of autobiographic mem-
ories (e.g., Drace & Desrichard, 2013). The associative 
network theory (Bower, 1981) posits that emotions form 
nodes that are organized into memory networks contain-
ing information that shares the same valence. For instance, 
Bower states that events learned in one psychic state can 
be remembered better when one is put back into the same 
state. Relying on classic network theories (e.g., Anderson, 
1983) where it is posited that activation presumably spreads 
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from one concept to another, or from one proposition to an-
other, through associative linkages between them, a clear 
analogy with memory and emotion can be made. Each dis-
tinct emotion has a specific node or unit in memory. These 
emotions can be activated by many stimuli and activation 
of an emotion node also spreads activation throughout the 
memory structures. Thus, when an emotion node is acti-
vated by emotional information in the environment (e.g., a 
mood induction procedure), congruent thoughts in memory 
are activated and thus become more accessible. Conse-
quently, negative memories come to mind more easily when 
individuals are in a negative mood and positive memories 
come to mind more easily when individuals are in a positive 
mood. Another explanation of the mood congruence effect 
is drawn from the affect-as-information model (Schwarz, 
2001). According to this approach, people use their mo-
mentary feeling states as diagnostic information for making 
evaluative judgments about a specific object. For example, 
when asked to recall an autobiographical memory related to 
a specific period in one’s life, people’s initial reactions are 
evaluative in that they ask themselves the question: “What 
was my life like at that time?” As a result, people who are 
in a good mood will make more positively biased assess-
ments of the life period in question and people who are in 
a bad mood will make more negatively biased assessments. 
This general appraisal will then cue the search for relevant 
autobiographical episodes, so the recall is more likely to be 
mood congruent.
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However, an alternative explanation that is frequently 
proposed in the literature questions the reliability of affect-
based explanations. According to this explanation, the mood 
congruence effect can be explained by semantic priming. 
Some authors argue that the mood-inducing situation also 
carries semantic content that can directly prime similar 
cognitions and materials in memory (e.g., Blaney, 1986; 
Rholes, Riskind, & Lane, 1987). Subsequently, the cogni-
tions activated by the situation can semantically prepare or 
guide cognitive processes such as recalling autobiographi-
cal episodes. As a result, the mood congruency observed in 
the literature can be seen as a form of the classic semantic 
priming effect (Higgins & King, 1980), which is independ-
ent of an individual’s affective state. 
Does affect really play role in mood congruence effect? 
When addressing this question, researchers have usually 
tried to isolate the influence of the affective state by select-
ing mood induction procedures that are not supposed to 
activate semantic concepts, congruent with the material to 
be recalled. However, as suggested by some authors (e.g., 
Drace & Desrichard, 2013) there are two problems with this 
approach. First, studies of this type often produce contradic-
tory findings, with some concluding that the mood congru-
ence effect is not caused by an individual’s affective state 
(Mayer, Gayle, Meehan, & Haarman, 1990; Rholes et al., 
1987; Riskind, 1983; Riskind, Rholes, & Eggers, 1982), 
and others suggesting the opposite (Ehrlichman & Halpren, 
1988; Kumari, Hemsley, Cotter, Checkley, & Grey, 1998; 
Schnall & Laird, 2003). Second, the methodology used in 
this type of study does not allow us to confirm the valid-
ity of the affective hypothesis. In fact, even more natural-
istic mood-induction procedures, which are supposed to 
be semantically nonintrusive (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant 
odours), can incidentally activate cognitions whose effect 
could be mistaken for the effect of mood (Ehrlichman & 
Halpren, 1988). 
To disentangle the role of affective and semantic pro-
cesses, Drace (2013) recently proposed an alternative meth-
od, which consisted in utilisation of the hot and cold mood 
inductions (Lantermann & Otto, 1996; Siemer, 2005). In 
both conditions participants were asked to look at a series of 
positive or negative pictures while listening to music. Those 
in the hot induction conditions were exposed to the stand-
ard procedure asking them to look at the pictures and try to 
vividly imagine themselves as witnesses of each situation 
(Drace, Desrichard, Shepperd, & Hoorens, 2009; Drace, 
Ric, & Desrichard, 2010). Participants in the cold induc-
tion condition were watching the same stimuli but in a more 
distant way. In order to minimize the mood-inducing effect 
of pictures, participants were instructed to pay attention to 
the person’s description (e.g., age, gender, clothes, etc.), as 
well as the background details (e.g., objects, colours, places, 
etc.). In line with previous research, the author found a con-
gruency between the valence of the induced mood and the 
valence of the autobiographical memories. Importantly, the 
interaction between mood and induction method was also 
significant. Although participants were exposed to the same 
semantic material, only the hot mood induction (i.e., the 
condition in which mood was changed) congruently influ-
enced autobiographical recall. Finally, the effect of the hot 
mood induction on autobiographical recall was mediated by 
the participants’ affective state.
The present research
As noted above, recent research suggests that affective 
state influences the mood congruence effect in a way that 
cannot be explained by semantic priming alone. However, 
this research seems to be characterized by an important 
limitation that we propose to address in the present study. 
As described in Drace’s (2013) procedure, participants in 
the cold induction condition were instructed to pay attention 
to various situational details whereas participants in the hot 
condition had to vividly imagine themselves as a witness of 
each situation. Considering these differences, it is possible 
that participants in the hot condition were accidentally led to 
think more about positive or negative consequences, or im-
plications of the situation presented in the picture, which are 
different semantic concepts from the ones activated in the 
cold condition (i.e., objects, colours, places; which could 
be more neutral). Therefore, the instructions in the hot and 
cold inductions could activate different semantic content, 
which in turn might exert corresponding influence on auto-
biographic recall.
In order to address these concerns, we designed an ex-
periment that follows a procedure similar to the one used 
by Drace (2013) with substantial changes. Considering that 
different instructions could engender different levels of se-
mantic activation we chose a standard procedure that mir-
rored the hot induction procedure. Unlike Drace’s study, one 
group of participants was in a neutral mood condition while 
the other group was in a standard negative mood condition. 
Crucially, we introduced another negative mood condition 
in which participants were exposed to the same semantic 
material (i.e., pictures) but were induced to feel less intense 
negative affective state by applying a shorter version of the 
same mood inducing method. In that manner we could test 
the mood congruence hypothesis by opposing different con-
ditions in terms of valence (i.e., comparison between neutral 
and both the moderate and strong negative mood conditions) 
and the intensity (i.e., comparison between moderate and 
strong negative mood conditions). We made this methodo-
logical choice primarily because negative mood inductions 
have been shown to be more effective than positive ones 
(Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). These differ-
ences in inductions are probably due to the fact that subjects 
from a normal population usually enter the experiment in a 
rather positive mood and that such a positively biased basic 
mood is harder to enhance than to depress. Considering this, 
we expected that it was more difficult to manipulate the in-
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tensity of positive, rather than negative mood. Importantly, 
the specific features of this experimental design allow us 
to test directly, the affective and semantic priming expla-
nations against each other. To be precise, if the semantic 
priming explanation is true, then participants in moderate 
and strong negative mood should indifferently recall less 
positive memories than those in the neutral mood condi-
tion. However, even though participants in the two negative 
mood conditions are exposed to the same semantic mate-
rial they do differ in terms of intensity of induced affective 
state. Therefore, based on the assumption that affective state 
plays a role in the mood congruence effect, then the mood 
congruence effect should wary with valence but also with 
the intensity of negative mood. Thus, participants in the 
neutral mood condition should recall less negative memo-
ries than those in moderate negative mood condition who in 
turn should recall less negative memories than those in the 
strong negative mood condition.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 45 psychology undergraduates (42 
females; mean age = 19.2, SD = 2.3) from the University 
of Sarajevo whose participation was a partial fulfilment of 
their study requirements. Participants were randomly as-
signed in one of three mood conditions: neutral, moderate 
negative, and strong negative mood. 
Mood induction procedure
The mood induction procedure was similar to the one 
used by Drace and his colleagues (Drace, 2013; Drace et 
al., 2009; Drace et al., 2010). During a period of 10 min-
utes, participants were asked to look at a series of pictures 
while listening to music. We selected pictures from the In-
ternational Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, 
& Cuthbert, 1995)1. The music was drawn from selections 
used in prior research (Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). Par-
ticipants in the neutral mood condition listened to selections 
from Brahm’s Symphony No. 1 in C Minor. Participants in 
the negative mood conditions listened to selections from 
Mahler’s Adagietto. 
Measures
Mood. Participants’ mood was assessed using the Brief 
Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 
1988). Participants had to rate on 4-point scales the extent 
to which he or she was feeling at “the very moment” each 
of the eight positive (e.g., happy, lively) and eight negative 
(e.g., sad, gloomy) feeling states. A BMIS score was cal-
culated for each participant by subtracting the sum of the 
scores obtained for negative items (Cronbach’s alpha = .79) 
from the sum obtained for positive items (Cronbach’s al-
pha = .78). The higher a participant’s BMIS score, the more 
positive his mood. 
Semantic activation. To control for the quality of seman-
tic activation in different mood conditions participants had 
to make lexical decisions for series of negative and neu-
tral words (Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). The shorter the 
participant’s decision response latency for specific word 
category, the more accessible the corresponding semantic 
concepts. 
Valence of recalled memory. Three independent judges, 
who were blind to the hypotheses and to the participants’ 
mood induction conditions, rated the recalled memory on 
a 7-point scale (1= very negative; 7 = very positive). As the 
consistency between judges was very high (Cronbach’s al-
pha = .97), we calculated a valence score for recalled mem-
ory by averaging the evaluations of the three judges. 
Procedure
Participants took part individually. In order to disguise 
the purpose of the research, the experimenter described the 
study as examining eyewitness testimony. Participants were 
told that the experiment would have three stages. Stage one 
involved viewing a series of pictures. Stage two consisted 
of a set of tasks in which the participants were asked to 
complete some questionnaires, ostensibly to simulate real 
eyewitness report situations, in which there is a time de-
lay between seeing an event and describing it, during which 
a witness’s attention is diverted by other stimuli. In stage 
three, the participants were asked to answer questions about 
the pictures. The participants were told that the music they 
would be listening to, throughout the experiment, was de-
signed to isolate them from environmental noises and to fa-
cilitate concentration on the pictures. 
After the participant had understood the procedure, the 
experimenter put on the headphones and the mood induc-
tion procedure began. Participants were shown each of the 
pictures for their condition for 15 seconds, with a gap of 
5 seconds between pictures, during which time the screen 
was black. Participants in the neutral and strong negative 
mood conditions were exposed to the standard procedure 
(e.g., Drace et al., 2009, 2010) asking them to look at the 
pictures and try to vividly imagine themselves as witness-
1 The following pictures were used for the mood inductions. Neutral 
mood: 2190, 2385, 2514, 2516, 2749, 2840, 2890, 5510, 5531, 5534, 
7004, 7006, 7009, 7010, 7020, 7050, 7160, 7170, 7175, 7185, 7187, 
7207, 7211, 7217, 7233, 7235. Negative mood: 2205, 2710, 2750, 
2900, 3180, 3220, 6212, 6213, 6530, 6550, 6570, 9000, 9041, 9050, 
9220, 9280, 9415, 9421, 9520, 9560, 9611, 9630, 9830, 9910, 9911, 
9920.
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es of each situation. Participants in the moderate negative 
mood condition received the same instructions but were ex-
posed to shorter inductions during which they watched only 
8 pictures, which were randomly selected from a set of 24 
pictures used in the strong condition. Prior work showed 
that sustained presentation of a series of pictures of simi-
lar valence produces emotional reactions that are sensitized 
across the temporal intervals (Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 
1996; Smith, Bradley, & Lang, 2005) and that it could be 
an efficient method to manipulate the intensity of negative 
mood (Drace et al., 2009).
After the mood induction, participants were first asked 
to fill in the BMIS and once they finished they were in-
structed to position themselves in front of a response box on 
the same table. A computer monitor was anchored 70 cm in 
front of them. The lexical decision task was then described 
to participants and they were acquainted with the procedure 
by performing 20 trials. Practice trials contained 10 non-
words and 10 neutral words. Participants then performed 48 
experimental trials presented in two blocks of 24. Half of 
the 24 experimental trials were nonwords trials. Nonwords 
were pronounceable letter strings. Mean and variance of 
the length of the nonwords were matched to those of the 
words. The 12 word trials contained six words from each of 
the two categories: sad (negative) and neutral, which were 
drawn from prior research (Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). 
The letter strings were presented in one random order to 
all subjects. The onset of each trial was signalled by a 300-
ms presentation of a fixation point. Following the 200-ms 
blank screen, the letter string appeared for a maximum of 
3000 ms. A button press terminated the trial. The buttons 
on the response box were labelled word and nonword. For 
half of the participants the former label was positioned by 
the participant’s right hand and for the other half this order 
was reversed.
After participants had completed the lexical decision 
task they were given a sheet of paper bearing the instruc-
tions: “Try to remember two specific events that happened 
to you during the last year. Write down a brief description 
of this memory. Your responses will be kept strictly confi-
dential”. The instructions were followed by spaces for writ-
ing the memory. This task was described as a part of the 
eyewitness testimony study in which the experimenter was 
interested in participants’ capacity to recall and describe a 
personal event. 
In the final stage of the procedure, the participants were 
asked to view a mixture of pictures, some of which had 
already been presented during the mood induction stage, 
along with pictures that had not been presented in the induc-
tion stage. The main purpose of the identification stage was 
to ensure that the participants had paid attention to the af-
fective material. All the participants correctly identified the 
pictures they had seen and the pictures they had not seen 
during the mood induction stage. When they had finished, 
the participants were thanked and debriefed.
RESULTS
Mood manipulation check 
To test the efficacy of mood inductions we conducted 
one-way ANOVAs with two orthogonal contrasts: a planned 
comparison testing the linear model and a contrast testing 
the remaining variance (i.e., the only contrast that should not 
be significant if the model tested fit the data). The planned 
comparison, which opposed the neutral and strong negative 
mood conditions (neutral = -1, moderate = 0, strong = 1), 
was significant, F(1, 42) = 14.95, p = .001, MSE = 54.22, 
ηp2 = .26. Importantly, the orthogonal contrast, opposing 
moderate negative mood condition to both the neutral and 
strong negative mood conditions (neutral = 1, moderate 
= -2, strong = 1) was not significant, F < 1. As expected, 
participants in the strong negative mood condition reported 
less positive moods (M = -3.26, SD = 8.05) than participants 
in the moderate negative mood condition (M = 1.93, SD = 
6.47), who, in turn, reported less positive moods than partic-
ipants in the neutral mood condition (M = 7.13, SD = 7.47). 
Mood inductions and semantic activation
Subjects made lexical decision errors on about 1% of 
the trials. Response latencies to incorrect word category as 
well as those lower than 300 ms and higher than 1500 ms 
were eliminated from the data set (cf. Niedenthal & Setter-
lund, 1994). Latencies that were greater than three standard 
deviations from the mean of their word category were also 
eliminated. So defined outliers constituted 2% of the data. 
According to the semantic priming explanation, mood-in-
ducing situations can directly prime and make more acces-
sible similar material in memory, which in turn can semanti-
cally prepare future cognitive processes. Thus, we expected 
participants in negative mood conditions to faster process, 
semantically congruent material and therefore display short-
er lexical decision time for negative words than participants 
in neutral mood condition. We expected the opposite pat-
tern of results for neutral words. To test this hypothesis the 
data were submitted to a 3 (mood induction; neutral, nega-
tive moderate, negative strong) x 2 (word category; nega-
tive, neutral) mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Mean response latencies and standard deviations for each 
word category averaged across item are reported in Table 1. 
The predicted Mood Induction x Word Category interaction 
was not significant, F < 1, which means that participants 
in the three mood conditions made lexical decisions in a 
similar way for neutral and negative words. We also didn’t 
obtain the main effect of mood induction, F(1, 42) = 2.53, 
p = .092, MSE = 26290, ηp2 = .10. The only significant, but 
relatively uninformative effect, was the main effect of word 
category, F(1, 42) = 17.96, p = .001, MSE = 39346, ηp2 = 
.29. As we can see in the Table 1, participants were gener-
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ally faster to make lexical decisions for negative words (M 
= 556.1, SD = 114.6) than for neutral words (M = 598.8, SD 
= 130.9).
Mood inductions and autobiographical recall
We expected the variations in the valence of the auto-
biographical memories to be congruent with the valence 
and the intensity of the mood inductions. The test for the 
planned comparison, which opposed the neutral and strong 
negative mood conditions (neutral = -1, moderate negative 
= 0, strong negative = 1), was significant, F(1, 42) = 13.94, 
p = .001, MSE = 1.35, ηp2 = .25. Importantly, the orthogo-
nal contrast, opposing moderate negative mood condition 
to both the neutral and strong mood conditions (neutral = 
1, moderate = -2, strong negative = 1), was not significant, 
F(1, 42) = 2.31, p = .135, ηp2 = .05. Consistent with our 
expectations, the participants in the strong negative mood 
condition reported less positive memories (M = 2.36, SD = 
0.73) than participants in the moderate negative (M = 3.27, 
SD = 1.33) mood condition, who, in turn, reported less posi-
tive memories than participants in the neutral mood condi-
tion (M = 3.95, SD = 1.32).
Mediation analysis
To test the mediating role of mood in the relation be-
tween mood induction and autobiographical recall, the re-
gression procedure advocated by Baron and Kenny (1986) 
was followed. First, the main effect of the independent vari-
able (i.e., mood induction) on the dependent variable (i.e., 
autobiographical recall) was significant, (β = .49, p = .001). 
Second, the main effect on the expected mediating variable 
(i.e., mood) was also significant, (β = .51, p = .001). Accord-
ing to Baron and Kenny the final and most basic require-
ment for mediation is that the mediating variable should 
predict the dependent variable even when the main effect of 
mood induction is statistically controlled, while the effect of 
independent variable on the dependent variable should be 
significantly reduced when the mediating variable is statisti-
cally controlled. As expected, the effect of mood induction 
on autobiographical recall was not significant when mood 
was statistically controlled (β = .29, p = .052). Moreover, 
the effect of mood on autobiographical recall remained sig-
nificant even when the effect of mood induction was sta-
tistically controlled (β = .39, p = .010). The Sobel test also 
revealed a significant mediation (z = 2.27, p = .023).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the 
impact of mood induction on memory accessibility varies 
as a function of affect. Our approach consisted in exposing 
individuals to the mood induction method, which varied in 
valence and mood intensity. As expected, participants in the 
strong negative mood condition reported less positive mood 
than participants in the moderate negative mood condition, 
who, in turn, reported less positive moods than partici-
pants in the neutral mood condition. In line with previous 
research, we found a congruency between the valence of 
the induced mood and the valence of the autobiographical 
memories (Blaney, 1986; Drace, 2013). Importantly, mood 
congruence was also influenced by the manipulation of the 
intensity of affective state. Although participants in the neg-
ative mood conditions were exposed to the same semantic 
material, those in the strong negative condition recalled less 
positive memories than participants in the moderate nega-
tive condition. Furthermore, the effect of mood inductions 
on autobiographical recall was mediated by the participants’ 
affective state measured by BMIS. Thus, using a different 
method, our study shows that affective state plays a role in 
mood congruence effect, which seems to support both the 
associative and the affect as information approaches (Bow-
er, 1981; Schwarz, 2001). 
One could argue that the results we obtained could be 
due to the difference in the semantic activation in moder-
ate and strong negative mood conditions. As we know, par-
ticipants in the moderate negative mood condition watched 
eight pictures whereas participants in the strong negative 
condition watched 24 pictures. Therefore, the later condi-
tion could prime more negative material in memory than the 
moderate condition. As a consequence, these differences in 
semantic activation could be responsible for the correspond-
ing effects on the autobiographical recall. Unfortunately, the 
results that we obtained on the lexical decision task did not 
provide us with valid insights to further address this issue. 
Indeed, although we didn’t found any difference in lexical 
decisions between negative mood conditions, the absence of 
the Mood Inductions x Word Category interaction suggest 
that the semantic activation measure perhaps was not sensi-
tive enough. Nevertheless, even when considering that this 
assumption is possible, it still cannot explain why the effect 
of induction was completely mediated by mood measure. 
Of course, it could be argued that the participants’ verbal 
responses to the BMIS items were also contaminated by the 
content of the IAPS pictures. If this was the case, it would 
mean that the BMIS was merely an indirect measure of the 
semantic aspects activated by the situation: a hypothesis 
Table 1
Mean lexical decision response latencies in milliseconds (and standard 




Neutral 604.24 (114.56) 598.79 (130.93)
Negative moderate 520.09 (77.07) 546.62 (73.81)
Negative strong 546.57 ( 86.41) 599.66 (124.29)
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that seems to be disproved by several factors. For example, 
Drace and Desrichard (2013) found that BMIS correlated 
with a non-verbal measure of affect (i.e., EMG activity of 
muscles corrugator supercilia and zygomaticus major) that 
should be less sensitive to semantic priming and that both 
measures mediated the relation between mood inductions 
and autobiographical recall. On the other side, the BMIS has 
been found to be sensitive to mood manipulation using a va-
riety of induction procedures, even those with low semantic 
content (e.g., Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). In addition, 
research has shown that exposing participants to positive 
or negative cognitive material plays a role in subsequent 
cognitive tasks, but does not change a participant’s mood 
as assessed by the BMIS (e.g., Innes Ker & Niedenthal, 
2002). Taken together, these findings suggest that poten-
tial confounds due to the differences in semantic activation 
can hardly explain the differences in mood captured by the 
BMIS.
Another potential explanation for our results could be 
that they are artefacts of experimenter demand. In line with 
this idea previous research showed that individuals possess 
lay theories consistent with the mood congruence effect 
(Eich & Macauley, 2000). Consequently, rather than being 
due to the participants’ affective state, our findings may sim-
ply reflect a social desirability bias. However, although this 
explanation could apply to the mood congruence involving 
conditions with different mood valence, it cannot account 
for the effect of the intensity of mood. Indeed, if partici-
pants responded to the situational (i.e., experimental) de-
mand, then, in moderate and strong conditions we should 
observe a similar pattern of autobiographical recall because 
these participants were exposed to the same situational cues 
(i.e., negative pictures). As we could see, this assumption is 
disconfirmed by our results.
Finally, one limitation of our study could be the absence 
of a positive mood condition. Although, this could question 
the generalization of our findings on positive affective state 
we don’t see any theoretical reason that supports this as-
sumption. Indeed, it has been shown that mood congruence 
in autobiographical recall is a general and well-established 
effect (Blaney, 1986). In addition, research suggests that this 
effect occurs more easily in positive than in negative mood 
because people often recall mood incongruent cognitions to 
neutralize their aversive affective state (Isen, 1985; Parrott 
& Sabini, 1990). Taken together, previous evidence gives us 
considerable reason to speculate that our findings could be 
extended to positive mood.
CONCLUSION
The present study contributes to the literature on mood 
and memory and shows that affective state plays a causal 
role in the relationship between mood inductions and au-
tobiographical recall. The next theoretical question that 
deserves more attention concerns the specification of the 
mechanisms through which mood influences autobiographi-
cal recall. Indeed, although affective explanations (Bower, 
1981; Schwarz, 2001) assume that the person’s affective 
state is the factor causing the mood congruence they are di-
vergent about the mediating mechanisms involved (mood as 
information vs. mood as primer). Therefore, the challenge 
for future research could be to identify which of these mech-
anisms is involved in the mood congruence effect. 
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